By Kenneth M. Pollack
In A swap in Time Kenneth M. Pollack and the Iraq coverage operating staff of The Saban heart for heart East coverage search to supply another, finished technique for American approach in Iraq. they start with the belief that even though the present U.S. strategy in Iraq is encountering significant problems and looks not likely to provide a solid Iraq in the subsequent to 5 years, the choice proposed through a few Bush management critics—a quick withdrawl—would additionally no longer serve U.S. pursuits. whereas many considerate specialists and policymakers have tried to provide a pragmatic 3rd plan of action, none have to this point succeeded in doing so. This document poses one of these technique.
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Extra resources for A Switch in Time: A New Strategy for America in Iraq
Underlying this objection is the notion that only offensive operations that harry insurgents and terrorists and leave them with no sanctuary can succeed. Although this concern appears to be common sense, it is unfounded because it exaggerates the threat and the difficulty of dealing with the threat. If enough suicide bom bers try, s ome will inevitably get through. However, strong, comprehensive security measures can prevent all but the most determined, best prepared, and luckiest of terrorists and insurgents from pen etrating defen s e s .
Very few of the Shi’i militias have ever tried to resist Coalition forces when they moved into an area in strength, because they understood that doing so was essentially suicidal. Once the Coalition has concentrated sufficient forces to move back into a population center in central or southern Iraq, it should be able to do so. Coalition forces must then remain in strength over time, and thereby obviate the need that drove the locals to support the militia. This is critical in Iraq not only to create a basis for defeating the insurgency, but to prevent the failedstate aspects of Iraq from causing the country to spiral into chaos and civil war.
Security personnel should routinely search persons entering large facilities, such as businesses or apartment complexes, street markets or shopping arcades, or sports aren a s . Fixed defen s ive positi on s , ch eckpoi n t s , or ambushes can be employed against known routes of insurgent infiltration. Above all, offensive operations should become the exception rather than the rule. A potential objection to such a defensive strategy is the fear that this will allow insurgents and terrorists in areas beyond the “oil stain” the freedom to plan and prepare operations in re lative peace, thereby greatly increasing the threat.