By Philip Gordon, Jeremy Shapiro
A radical research of the place U.S./European family have long gone wrong--and the right way to set them correct ALLIES AT battle is the 1st and so much finished evaluate of what went improper among the USA and Europe through the hindrance over Iraq and is predicated on vast interviews with policymakers within the usa and Europe. It places the problem over Iraq in ancient context by means of interpreting US-Europe kin considering that global warfare II and exhibits how the alliance frequently controlled to beat its many inner problems and crises. It describes how the deep strategic alterations that emerged on the finish of the chilly warfare and the disputes over the Balkans and the center East in the course of the Clinton years already had a few analysts wondering no matter if the Alliance might live on. It exhibits how the Bush administration’s unilateral international relations and world-view helped convey already simmering tensions to a boil, and describes extensive the occasions best as much as the Iraq problem of 2003. Gordon and Shapiro clarify how strong forces such emerging American strength and the September eleven terrorist assaults have made family among the US and Europe more and more tricky. however the authors argue that the break up over Iraq used to be no longer inevitable: it was once the results of inaccurate judgements and pointless provocations on either side. opposite to the normal knowledge that says that the Iraq battle signaled the powerful finish of the Atlantic Alliance, the authors warn that assuming the top of the Alliance may perhaps quick develop into a self-fulfilling prophesy: leaving the us remoted, resented, and liable for bearing the burdens of preserving foreign safeguard principally by myself. in accordance with those that argue that the Atlantic Alliance is not any longer conceivable or precious, ALLIES AT struggle demonstrates that even after Iraq, the us and Europe can interact, and certainly needs to in the event that they desire to successfully deal with the main urgent difficulties of our age. The ebook makes concrete proposals for restoring transatlantic family members and updating the alliance to satisfy new demanding situations like worldwide terrorism and the transformation of an volatile heart East.
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Additional info for Allies At War: America, Europe and the Crisis Over Iraq
But where we can’t join consensus, because of our own beliefs, or because we believe a particular issue and the direction it’s going with others does not serve the purpose intended by that action, the United States will stick to its principled position. . The President is that kind of leader. He speaks clearly, he speaks directly, and he makes sure people know what he believes in. And then he tries to persuade others that is the correct position. When it does not work, then we will take the position we believe is correct, and I hope the Europeans are left with a better understanding of the way in which we want to do business.
According to historian John Lewis Gaddis, “familiarity with federalism discouraged the view that strength could override the need for negotiation and compromise. ” 23 ALLIES AT WA R Despite the recognized need for compromise, however, the Atlantic alliance was a never a relationship of equals—a point often overlooked today. S. power and accorded a special role to the United States. That role did not entitle Washington to dictate to its partners in the manner of the Warsaw Pact. Rather, it meant that the alliance operated along certain norms of behavior that represented a compromise between the democratic principles embodied in its formal mechanisms and the realities of the power imbalance between the United States and Europe.
While there have certainly been differences within the administration on the degree to which allied views should be taken into account, these disagreements have often been exaggerated. Even Secretary of State Colin Powell, identified as the member of the cabinet with the most multilateral instincts, has explained the process this way: [Where] we have a principled position, what we will do is explain that principled position to our friends, try to see if we can find compromises, so we can join consensus.